In recent articles by the Lucchesi Advocacia team, written by Professor Guilherme Lucchesi and attorney Igor Arthur Rayzel, the authors explored the logic of spillover and the impacts of Law No. 12,850/2013 and Bill No. 5,582/2025, highlighting the tension between the necessary fight against organized crime and the erosion of the criminal and procedural guarantees of the accused.
In this context, it is worth clarifying: criminal policies adopted by the Brazilian Congress have gone beyond their stated targets. Although the direct focus of stricter criminal enforcement is on gangs, militias, and terrorist groups, the practical effects reach organizations and individuals who do not necessarily fit that profile. This article explores this phenomenon in the electoral arena and reflects on its impact on Brazilian elections.
The Involvement of Criminal Organizations in the Electoral Process
In a recent ruling, the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) blocked a candidate’s registration after recognizing him as a member of a paramilitary organization. The decision aimed to ensure the integrity of the electoral process, preventing it from being influenced by the financing and interference of criminal groups, while also preserving equal competition among candidates.
The vote of Justice Antonio Carlos Ferreira captures the essence of the ruling: there is no room for freedom under the rule of organized crime, nor for the exercise of a conscious and unimpeded vote grounded in free consent when criminal organizations infiltrate the political process.
Spillover into the Electoral Arena: Recent Cases
The understanding established by the TSE was not limited to cases involving proven ties to gangs or militias. Its logic has progressively expanded to reach situations where an alleged connection to organized crime is still under investigation or prosecution, with no final conviction. This movement reveals the risk of spillover: criminal policy begins to affect not only the guilty, but also those merely under investigation.
A paradigmatic example occurred in 2023, when the Supreme Federal Court (STF) rejected the charges filed against politicians from the so-called “MDB Gang,” accused of receiving bribes and participating in a criminal organization. The indictment was based solely on the statements of a cooperating witness, with no other evidence produced to establish probable cause for its acceptance.
Even so, the reputational damage to those involved was undeniable. The mere fact of being named as targets of such an accusation was enough to impact their public and electoral image — regardless of any conviction.
The case raises an additional tension: since all those involved were politicians affiliated with the same party, holding the same offices, and acting in a coordinated manner, one must ask to what extent the stability and division of tasks identified by prosecutors were not, in fact, a natural reflection of the ordinary dynamics of political and partisan activity — rather than evidence of a criminal structure.
Fighting Organized Crime and Its Influence on Elections
There is little doubt that a mere accusation of involvement with organized crime — regardless of whether formal charges are filed — directly influences the electoral process. It undermines voter confidence in the candidate and, ultimately, compromises the perceived legitimacy of the election itself.
While the initiatives of the Electoral Justice and the Working Group on Combating Organized Crime in the Electoral Arena (linked to the Attorney General for Electoral Affairs) deserve recognition, a concrete danger exists: the reach of these measures over individuals who are investigated, indicted, or otherwise implicated without a final conviction.
With each electoral cycle, challenges to candidacies multiply based on alleged ties between candidates and criminal organizations, grounded in ongoing criminal investigations and police inquiries. In response, the number of denied candidate registrations grows — based on “indicative elements of participation in a criminal organization” — removing from the race not only those convicted with final judgments, but also those merely investigated or indicted. The TSE’s case law has consolidated the position that the denial of a candidacy — and the resulting restriction of the candidate’s passive electoral capacity — does not depend on a final conviction.
Erosion of the Presumption of Innocence vs. the Integrity of the Democratic Electoral Process
This understanding creates a tension that is difficult to resolve: on one side, the presumption of innocence — a constitutional principle that can only be overcome by a final conviction — and on the other, the need to preserve the integrity of the electoral process in the face of infiltration by criminal organizations.
There is no simple answer. The challenge lies in building a system capable of preventing the influence of organized crime in elections without violating the fundamental and procedural guarantees of the accused. The restriction of political rights must be grounded in robust and unequivocal evidence of criminal participation — not in preliminary investigations or indictments unsupported by sufficient proof.
The debate is far from over, and its consequences for Brazilian democracy demand constant attention.
With the next election cycle approaching, the debate takes on even greater urgency. The tendency toward multiplying candidacy challenges based on organized crime investigations and indictments is likely to intensify — and with it, the risk that the electoral process will be used as an instrument of political persecution, barring candidates from running on the basis of a presumption of guilt.
The challenge for this electoral year will be to strike the right balance: protecting elections from criminal influence without turning an accusation into a preemptive punishment — and without allowing the fight against organized crime to become an instrument of lawfare and the criminalization of politics.
